From Gaza to the Golestan Palace: How States Protect Cultural Heritage in Crossfire
- Valentin & Zhao
- Apr 9
- 10 min read
The recent US-Israeli strikes caused damage to Tehran's Golestan Palace, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and a masterpiece of the Qajar Dynasty. Based on available information, the damage to the Golestan Palace was not a deliberate act targeting the site itself, but rather collateral damage from nearby military strikes by the US and Israel [1].
The vulnerability of cultural heritage in times of conflict is precisely what the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its 1999 Second Protocol sought to address [2]. These instruments require states to refrain from targeting cultural heritage and to prepare in advance to protect heritage in times of war.
Whilst the 1954 Convention established the foundational principles for protecting cultural heritage during international conflicts, the 1999 Second Protocol broadened its scope and strengthened its grip through:
Enhanced Protection: the Protocol introduces a system of "enhanced protection" for cultural heritage of the "greatest importance for humanity." Sites can be placed on a special list, making them off-limits for attack or military use.
Criminal Responsibility: the Protocol explicitly establishes individual criminal responsibility for serious violations, such as attacking protected cultural property. This reinforces the idea that such acts are not just unfortunate collateral damage, but potential war crimes.
Internal Conflicts: the Protocol applies to civil wars and internal conflicts, not just international conflicts.
We examine how the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and China have translated the Convention’s principles into domestic law, and what these approaches reveal about the practical protection of cultural heritage in an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape. We also briefly comment on the United States’ ratification of the Convention, as well as on the destruction of cultural property in other areas of the Middle East, such as Gaza and Baghdad.
I. The United Kingdom Approval Came Late
The UK's journey to ratification was a long one. It originally chose not to ratify the Convention in 1954 due to concerns about its effectiveness. However, the adoption of the 1999 Second Protocol, which the UK helped negotiate, addressed these concerns and paved the way for ratification.
The Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 was passed to enable the UK to finally ratify the Convention and accede to the 1999 Protocol. The Act formally incorporates the international treaties into UK law, with the full texts of the Convention, its Regulations, and both Protocols scheduled within the Act itself.
The 2017 Act and accompanying guidance establish several key measures:
New Criminal Offences: the Act introduces several new offences with extraterritorial reach, meaning they can be prosecuted in the UK even if committed abroad. They include:
Serious Violations: making it an offence to commit acts such as making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of attack, or using such property in support of military action. This offence carries a penalty of up to 30 years in prison.
Unlawful Dealing: creating an offence of dealing in cultural property that has been illegally exported from occupied territory.
Misuse of Emblem: prohibiting the unauthorised use of the distinctive "blue shield" cultural emblem.
Peacetime Safeguarding and Inventories: Article 3 of the Convention requires states to prepare in peacetime for the safeguarding of cultural property. The UK's approach is to build on existing heritage protection systems rather than creating new requirements for owners.
Identifying Protected Property: the government, working with heritage bodies like Historic England, has published an indicative list of cultural property categories that meet the Convention's definition. This includes all Grade I listed buildings, UK World Heritage Sites, and designated museum collections [3].
Safeguarding Measures: bodies responsible for cultural property are encouraged to implement measures such as preparing inventories, planning for emergencies like fire or structural collapse, and planning for the removal or in-situ protection of movable objects. Historic England provides guidance and templates for emergency planning and has shared data on heritage assets with the Ministry of Defence and NATO to help prevent accidental damage during military operations.
Military Integration: the Convention requires states to introduce provisions into military regulations and foster a spirit of respect for cultural property among armed forces. The sharing of detailed heritage data with the Ministry of Defence is a key practical step to achieve this.
Cultural Emblem: the Act regulates the use of the blue and white shield emblem, which is used to mark and identify protected cultural property. Authorisation to use the emblem is required from the relevant national authority (e.g. Scottish Ministers in Scotland).
II. The UAE: Regulation without a Conflict Framework
The United Arab Emirates acceded to the 1954 Hague Convention but not the Second Protocol. A country that has not ratified the Second Protocol is not legally bound by its most powerful tools, including:
the system of "enhanced protection" for the world's most vital sites;
the explicit obligation to criminalise attacks against cultural property;
the strengthened framework for international cooperation and the prosecution of offenders.
In short, the UAE is playing by the 1954 rulebook but has not signed up to the stricter, modern rules added in 1999.
Its primary domestic instrument, Federal Law No. 11 of 2017 on Antiquities and Museums, is principally concerned with the UAE's own archaeological and historical assets: regulating excavation, prohibiting unauthorised export, and vesting ownership of discovered antiquities in the state. It is, in essence, a patrimony law rather than a conflict law.
Where the UAE has developed more sophisticated legal infrastructure is in the financial regulation of the art market. The Abu Dhabi Global Market’s DNFBP framework imposes due diligence obligations on designated business categories [4]. The framework may capture certain art market participants under its high-value goods provisions, though art dealers are not explicitly named as a regulated category. This is meaningful for illicit trafficking, but it is a different problem from armed conflict. The compliance architecture is oriented toward money laundering, not missiles.
The gap is not merely technical. The UAE is a stone's throw away from some of the most devastating cultural heritage losses of the past two decades, such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Simultaneously, it has positioned itself as among the world's most ambitious art market destinations.
The Antiquities Law was enacted the same year as the opening of the Louvre Abu Dhabi, which has since been joined by the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi, the Natural History Museum, the Zayed National Museum and others in what is becoming one of the most ambitious cultural infrastructure projects of its kind. That ambition sits in unresolved tension with the absence of a meaningful armed conflict protection framework.
III. China: The Heritage Diplomacy beyond the Convention’s Reach
China acceded [5] to the 1954 Convention in 2000, but not the Second Protocol. Its domestic implementation of the treaty obligations is mainly reflected in the Law on Cultural Relics Protection 1982, as revised in 2024 (Relics Law) and Criminal Law 1979, as amended in 2021. Unlike the UK, neither law was enacted in order to accede to the Convention, as both predate China’s accession.
1. Relics Law 1982:
Classification, Digitalisation and Census: the law establishes a tiered system of protection for cultural relics and heritage sites, with measures calibrated to each tier. It also mandates nationwide surveys and digitalisation of cultural relics for comprehensive inventories.
Export Control: the permanent export of state-owned or designated precious cultural relics is prohibited. Temporary export of Grade I relics for exhibition is subject to State Council approval, with an absolute prohibition on the export of unique or fragile Grade I relics.
Pre-construction Archeological Survey: a compulsory survey must take place before construction may commence on sites of potential heritage significance.
Administrative Sanctions: up to RMB 10 million （USD 1.45 million) may be imposed for violations, making the previous “toothless” law considerably more deterrent in effect.
2. Criminal Law 1979:
Protection of Cultural Relics: the section called “Crime of Obstructing Cultural Relics Management” covers damage, destruction, or illegal dealing of cultural relics, with penal levels calibrated to the classification of the relics concerned and whether the act was committed intentionally or negligently.
Prohibition of Looting: up to five years' imprisonment is imposed on any serviceman who plunders civilians' property during wartime. Although cultural property is not expressed mentioned, property belonging to civilians can be interpreted broadly to include cultural objects in private ownership. However, this protection does not extend to state-owned cultural property, such as museums, monuments, and heritage sites, revealing a gap in China's wartime framework.
China has not been party to a major international armed conflict in recent decades, which means its wartime obligations under the Convention have never been tested in any contemporary operational context. Accordingly, the critical question is not what China would do under fire, but what it does in peacetime.
Apart from its domestic law, China has developed a parallel logic of heritage protection that operates largely outside the framework of the 1954 Convention:
Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has positioned heritage protection as an instrument of foreign policy by funding restoration projects, and signing bilateral cultural agreements characterised as “civilisational stewardship” across Southeast and Central Asia, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. It operates bilaterally and proactively, outside the Convention's accountability mechanisms.
China is a founding member of ALIPH [6], the Geneva-based foundation dedicated to heritage protection in conflict and post-conflict areas, reflecting a willingness to engage with multilateral conflict-specific mechanisms that operate on fundamentally different terms from the BRI’s bilateral logic.
IV. A Word on the United States
In 2003, when US troops invaded Iraq, the US was not yet bound by the 1954 Hague Convention. Whilst archaeologists had specifically warned the Pentagon about the Baghdad Museum (formally known as the Iraq National Museum), and US troops were stationed nearby, looters entered and ransacked the museum. Approximately 15,000 items were stolen, with over 25,000 items damaged or destroyed in the chaos. US forces were criticised for not securing the museum while guarding other sites (including oil sites). Experts characterised this failure as neglect of cultural heritage and exposed a critical failure in pre-war planning.
The instrument that would have addressed what happened in Baghdad is the 1999 Second Protocol, which, to date, the US has not ratified. The Protocol reinforces the idea that bombing cultural sites is not just unfortunate collateral damage, but a potential war crime. It creates individual criminal responsibility, establishes Enhanced Protection for specific sites, and requires advance planning for cultural property protection in military operations. Its absence from US domestic law is not an oversight, but a position.
V. Heritage under Fire: Gaza, Tehran, Compromises and Sparks of Hope
In the aftermath of yet another blunder by the US/Israeli army in Tehran, is it not time for sovereign nations to show commitment to protecting cultural heritage in times of conflict by ratifying the 1999 Protocol? While the "toolkit" it provides is sound, the political will to use those tools consistently is the critical missing piece.
The damage to cultural heritage in Gaza since 2023 serves as a stark case study. UNESCO and other agencies have documented the destruction of sites of great cultural value, such as the Great Omari Mosque, the Pasha Palace, and parts of the Saint Porphyrius Greek Orthodox Church. These were not just old buildings; they were active parts of community life, with the Saint Porphyrius Church complex reportedly being damaged while sheltering displaced civilians.
This destruction illustrates the core problem: the framework is only as strong as the commitment of the warring parties to follow it.
Despite these challenges, the system is not static. There are positive signs that the international community is actively working to make the Protocol more effective:
Continued Adherence: as recently as January 2026, the Republic of Moldova acceded to the Second Protocol, demonstrating that states continue to see value in joining and being bound by its rules.
Ongoing Investigations: international bodies are actively investigating destruction. The UN Human Rights Council has highlighted that attacks on cultural sites in Gaza "may constitute war crimes," keeping the door open for future accountability.
Proactive Measures: UNESCO continues to promote the system, for example, by granting "enhanced provisional protection" to specific historic sites in conflict zones to try and shield them from further destruction. There are also ongoing efforts to improve military training on cultural property protection.
Whilst the 1999 Second Protocol provides the essential legal architecture for protecting cultural heritage today, its effectiveness is compromised by a persistent enforcement gap. The challenge for the next few years is not to rewrite the rules, but to find more effective ways to ensure they are respected and to hold violators accountable.
This article is co-authored by Pierre Valentin, art lawyer based in London, and Jiaxin Zhao, art lawyer based in Abu Dhabi and partner of Gouchault & Zhao.
[1] The US has ratified the 1954 Convention but not the Second (1999) Protocol. Israel has not ratified the Convention or the Second Protocol.
[2] The First Protocol (adopted May 14, 1954) prohibits the export of movable cultural property from occupied territory during armed conflict and requires its return to the territory of origin at the end of hostilities. It also bans retaining such property as war reparations.
[4] ADGM Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Rules and Guidance, Rule 3.2.1, defines DNFBPs to include any dealer trading a sellable item where the transaction equals or exceeds USD 15,000 in cash. Art dealers are not explicitly designated but may fall within this category depending on the nature of their transactions.
[5] In international law, a state that signed a treaty during its original signing window and later formally binds itself is said to have “ratified” it; a state that did not sign initially and later binds itself is said to have “acceded” to it. The case of China is a curious one, as although China appears as a signatory of the Hague Convention in 1954, it was signed by the government of the Republic of China (i.e. Taiwan). The People’s Republic of China, which did not hold China’s seat at the United Nations until 1971, does not recognise that signature as having bound it, and accordingly treated its 2000 act as an accession rather than a ratification. The 1954 Convention document explains the United Nation’s adoption of this situation in greater detail at Note 2.
[6] International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage (ALIPH) was created in 2017 through a Franco-Emirati initiative. Its founding member states are France, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Luxembourg, China and Morocco. Cyprus and Uzbekistan joined after as member states.
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